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Host Country R&D Determinants of MNE Entry Strategy:  
A Study of Ownership in the Automobile Industry 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
We investigate how host country R&D influences ownership decisions made by technology-
intensive multinational enterprises (MNEs) as they internationalize. We draw from institutional 
and resource based theories, as well as literature on agglomeration and clusters, and construct a 
unique dataset of 1324 foreign investments recorded by German automobile manufacturers 
between 2005 and 2012 for our empirical tests. We find that in host countries that are cluster-
abundant there will be a greater likelihood that technology-intensive MNEs will adopt joint 
ventures over wholly-owned subsidiaries, and will more likely use a lower equity stake in any 
joint venture. We find partial support for the influence of other aspects of host country R&D, 
including innovation output and inward technology FDI. Various robustness tests and insights 
from selected cases provide further support. Importantly, findings demonstrate the importance of 
multi-dimensional characteristics of host country R&D over and above those such as market size, 
political stability and cultural distance that are more commonly utilized and discussed in the 
entry strategy literature. The findings have implications for host country policy as well as 
strategy-makers in MNEs seeking to compete on the basis of globalized R&D. 
 
 
Key Words: MNE ownership decisions, patenting, clusters, technology transfer, automobile 
industry 
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1. Introduction 
The internationalization of R&D by multinational enterprises (MNEs) has been taking 
place for over 40 years (Wortmann, 1990), and has continued relentlessly (OECD, 2007). MNEs 
have increasingly internationalized in order to be close to sources of R&D in host countries. 
Overseas subsidiaries of MNEs act as a vital link between host country R&D and MNE 
networks, allowing the MNE to update strategic assets through internationalization (Cantwell 
and Mudambi, 2005; Dunning, 2000). Industries such as pharmaceuticals, IT development, 
aerospace, and smart phones have become characterized by MNEs with vast, continually 
evolving global networks of R&D. 
Given this phenomenon, the relationships between R&D characteristics of host countries 
and internationalization strategy of MNEs are important to understand. Berry, Guillén and Zhou 
(2010) touched on this in their discussion of distance measures in international business research, 
showing how knowledge distance (i.e., the difference between home and host country in terms of 
numbers of patents and scientific articles) has a significant impact on foreign market entry 
choice. Hennart (2009) argued that entry mode is determined by the need to bundle local 
complementary assets with MNE assets, acknowledging the role that host country R&D 
characteristics might have in MNE internationalization. Meyer et al. (2009) highlighted the 
connection between access to host country tacit and intangible knowledge and entry mode. 
Unfortunately, the bulk of research on MNE entry strategy, and ownership decisions in 
particular, does not explicitly capture host country R&D and its various forms (Canabal and 
White, 2008). One stream of literature on host country R&D and MNE strategy implicitly 
assumes the internationalization / entry mode choice already has already been made, i.e., the 
MNE has already internationalized (e.g., Almeida and Phene, 2004; Frost, 2001). However, host 
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country R&D matters pre-entry because it represents future-oriented technological opportunity 
for the MNE. It may not only attract technology-intensive MNEs to consider investing in the host 
country, it has the potential to determine how they invest in the country. While extensive 
research has looked at location advantages and disadvantages (Dunning, 1998, 2000), the vast 
body on ownership has tended to emphasize features such as market characteristics, legal 
barriers, cultural distance and country risk factors (e.g., Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; 
Canabal and White, 2008; Delios and Henisz, 2003; Hennart and Larimo, 1998; López-Duarte 
and Vidal-Suárez, 2013; Yiu and Makino, 2002). Furthermore, some research on MNE entry 
strategy focusses on variance in firm and industry characteristics, ignoring the potential that host 
country R&D may account for entry decisions (e.g., Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Chen and 
Hennart, 2002; Dikova, and Van Witteloostuijn, 2007).  
We believe there is a gap in the literature with respect to the links between host country 
R&D and MNE entry strategy. Host country R&D is particularly relevant for technology-
intensive MNEs that are ‘on the look-out’ for R&D capabilities and technological opportunities 
in host countries. For technology-intensive MNEs, host country attractiveness is not just about 
market size and various sources of non-commercial risk, it also relates to R&D opportunities. 
Following their extensive literature review on entry strategy research, Ahsan and Musteen (2011) 
called for more research on the effect of host country attractiveness on entry strategy. We believe 
this should extend to upstream features of host countries, as well as the demand-side. Also, there 
have been calls for entry strategy research to consider the role played by local complementary 
assets (Hennart, 2009) and for more research on entry strategy using specific industry samples 
(Brouthers and Hennart, 2007).  
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We address this research gap by examining the links between three dimensions of host 
country R&D and ownership decisions (mode and equity level). These dimensions are host 
country innovation output (captured through patenting, an indication of the health of the 
country’s national innovation system), the extent of clusters and R&D collaboration in the host 
country (an indication of its policy towards agglomeration and related institutions for economic 
development through proximity and networks), and inward technology FDI (an indicator of 
whether the host country seeks to receive and absorb technology through internationally 
transferable resources). Drawing on institutional and resource-based theories we develop 
hypotheses for the effects of these determinants. Empirical tests using data on 1324 foreign 
investments made by technology-intensive German automobile manufacturers in 65 countries 
reveal: (1) host country R&D determinants are an important predictor of ownership decisions 
adopted by technology-intensive MNEs in their internationalization; (2) host country R&D 
determinants are more important for these types of companies than market size, political stability 
and cultural distance, which are commonly used independent variables in the entry strategy 
literature; (3) clustering is the most consistent host country R&D determinant, although 
innovation output and inward tech FDI play a role; (4) as JVs are defined at higher equity 
thresholds, the effects for host country clustering and inward technology FDI become stronger; 
(5) different aspects of a host country’s R&D environment have different impacts on MNE entry 
strategy. 
Our study makes three important contributions. Firstly, we add to the literature on host 
country R&D determinants of entry strategy by technology-intensive MNEs. We show the 
importance of clustering over innovation output and inward technology FDI as a factor 
encouraging inward investors to opt for a JV and lower equity stakes within JVs. Secondly, we 
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show how institutional and resource-based explanations of this phenomenon are relevant to 
explaining entry strategy of technology-intensive MNEs. This suggests technology-intensive 
MNEs are more concerned about legitimacy and knowledge seeking imperatives than 
economizing on transaction costs as they expand abroad. Thirdly, we shed new light on 
internationalization patterns in the global automotive industry, an industry that had $105B of 
spending on R&D in 2014 (Strategy&, 2015) and one that accounted for 15.4% of global R&D 
spending in 20161. We identify reasons why MNEs in the automotive industry seek JVs and 
lower equity stakes in foreign markets, despite the overarching tendency towards full control and 
higher equity stakes in foreign investments made by automotive companies possessing 
formidable firm-specific advantages (Pfaffmann and Stephan, 2001; Talay and Cavusgil, 2009; 
Yiu and Makino, 2002). 
 
2. Understanding MNE ownership decisions 
Early work on ownership drew largely from transaction cost and internalization theory 
and the need for firms to economize on transaction costs as they internationalize. More recently 
scholars have devoted considerable attention to alternative theoretical bases for understanding 
ownership (i.e., the choice between a wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) and a joint venture (JV)) 
and the underlying equity stake in international markets, prominently institutional and resource-
based theories (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Mani et al., 2007). Yiu and Makino (2002), for 
instance, built on institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995) to argue that 
MNE ownership decisions can be seen as a response to isomorphic pressures in the external 
environment, as well as internal organizational practices and routines. Institutions provide the 
                                                        
1 https://www.statista.com/statistics/270233/percentage-of-global-rundd-spending-by-industry/ accessed 10 July 
2017 
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structure for investments to occur (North, 1990). This structure consists of regulative, normative 
(social obligations) and cognitive (collective constructions of social reality) dimensions (Scott, 
1995). In this sense, institutions set “the rules of the game” through coercive, mimetic and 
normative mechanisms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Rodriguez et al., 2005). They determine 
the degree of stability in society as well as the extent to which property rights are undermined 
(Brouthers, 2002). Williams et al. (2017) showed how institutions at supra-national level can also 
play a role in influencing levels of ownership adopted by MNEs in host countries. Such 
institutions not only provide a basis against which the MNE seeks legitimacy, they also provide 
“reassurance power” (Williams et al., 2017) that will help the MNE to overcome risk and 
uncertainty in the host country.  
Institutional theory suggests that in countries where the institutional environment 
undermines confidence, businesses will seek a lesser degree of control (North, 1990). A weak 
institutional environment encompasses conditions that compromise property and contract rights, 
therefore increasing the investment hazards. When a country has a weak institutional 
environment, firms are less likely to commit because a greater degree of ownership implies 
greater responsibility and risks (Brouthers, 2002). Hence, the institutional environment has an 
impact on the suitability of governance structures. MNEs will waive full ownership for their 
subsidiaries abroad and prefer shared ownership to counteract their subjection to institutional 
hazard (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Gomes-Casseres, 1990). Henisz (2000) argued a more 
nuanced line in that MNEs will choose shared ownership when political hazards increase but will 
opt for full ownership as contractual hazards increase (i.e., possible opportunistic behaviour from 
local partners and/or host governments). 
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 A further approach for understanding ownership in foreign markets revolves around 
resources, capabilities and knowledge. MNEs can exploit their assets in international markets, or 
can use international markets to augment these assets (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007). Mutinelli 
and Piscitello (1998) showed how MNEs opt for JVs over WOS when they need to complement 
in-house R&D resources. Drawing on Italian FDI data, these authors shone the spotlight on how 
a lack of specialized resources and capabilities in firms can be a motive for pursuing JVs in 
foreign markets. Such JVs help the investing firm to develop new technology and specialized 
capabilities. Research has also highlighted links between resource-based advantages of firms and 
the use of WOS mode (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Gomes-Casseres, 1990). Nonetheless, 
knowledge sourcing and learning remain a major motive for the internationalization of MNEs 
(Dunning, 2000; Kuemmerle, 1997), especially in knowledge-intensive industries where 
developing an R&D capability through overseas linkages with innovative companies and 
prominent knowledge centres such as universities and research institutions can be crucial to 
long-term performance (Iwasa and Odagiri, 2004).  
 
3. Hypothesis development 
These theoretical perspectives suggest specific areas of concern for technology-intensive 
MNEs: gaining legitimacy and responding to isomorphic pressure in institutional theory, and 
augmenting and exploiting assets in resource-based logic. We examine the relevance of these 
concerns as MNEs consider different dimensions of host country R&D during 
internationalization. A summary of the core arguments is given in Appendix A. 
 
3.1 The host country as a generator of innovation 
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 A technology-intensive MNE can be attracted to invest in a country because it sees the 
country as a generator of innovation. However, countries vary considerably in terms of their 
capacities to generate innovation. Innovation output, often assessed in terms of patenting 
productivity, is associated with sophisticated and high grade technological activity taking place 
in a country (Athreye and Cantwell, 2007; Frost, 2001). The occurrence of this activity will 
appeal to technology-intensive MNEs seeking to tap into globalized R&D. 
 In terms of formal institutions, countries that are large scale generators of innovation are 
likely to have strong and stable institutional profiles both in terms of political and regulatory 
environments (Waguespack et al., 2005). Such countries will have a highly regarded protection 
regime for intellectual property rights and investors will be able to trust in the governance 
infrastructure of the country in case those rights are not respected. This institutional quality of 
the host country can influence ownership decisions. In Dikova and van Witteloostuijn’s (2007) 
study, for instance, JVs were seen as more preferable over WOS in countries with high levels of 
institutional advancement (i.e., high levels of governance quality). 
 In terms of isomorphic pressure in institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), 
there is unlikely to be regulative pressure to choose a specific ownership mode in connection 
with levels of patenting in the country. However, there may be cognitive or normative pressure 
for the MNE to engage in exploring new technologies in the host country and to become 
involved in the generation of innovations in the host country. Castellani and Zanfei (2002) 
briefly mentioned this as a possible factor that could explain gradual involvement of MNEs in 
creative activities in host countries (Castellani and Zanfei, 2002: 6). Yiu and Makino (2002) 
demonstrated empirically a link between isomorphic pressures and levels of ownership. MNEs 
will be more likely to seek legitimacy within the R&D environment of an innovation-productive 
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host country by making lower equity stakes in JVs. These will demonstrate a willingness to 
explore new early stage technologies with partners (Dittrich et al., 2007) over a fully controlled 
WOS that is designed to exploit firm specific advantages and buffer against contextual risk (Yiu 
and Makino, 2002). What matters from an institutional perspective is the need to establish 
legitimacy in the R&D environment of the country. 
 From a resource-based perspective, high innovation output in a host country is seen as an 
indicator of high grade intangible assets and national competence in R&D. Foreign MNEs in 
technology-intensive industries increasingly need to tap into innovative capabilities wherever 
they may be in the world, they are not necessarily assumed to originate from a home country 
(Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005, 2011; Kuemmerle, 1999; Meyer et al., 2009). Host countries that 
are highly productive in patenting will possess locational factors conducive to MNEs pursuing 
competence-creating mandates (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005). In March’s (1991) terms, such 
subsidiaries will pursue explorative activities, augmenting home-based assets (Kuemmerle, 
1999). According to March (1991), an exploring enterprise is one that seeks to discover new 
possibilities, takes on risk, and which needs to be flexible. JVs provide the structural answer to 
this flexibility (Dittrich et al., 2007). Exploitation, on the other hand, is aligned with 
competence-exploiting mandates - achieving efficiency, production, implementation and 
execution. Exploration is conducive to partnerships between firms from different business areas 
– this providing diversity in the actors involved in the innovation process and access to 
previously unknown knowledge and resources.  
 
Hypothesis 1:  
 
The greater the innovation output of a host country, the more likely a technology-intensive 
foreign MNE will (a) choose a JV over a WOS, and (b) will use a lower equity stake in any JV in 
the host country. 
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3.2 The host country as a domain for clustering and R&D collaboration 
A technology-intensive MNE may also consider a host country because of the state of 
development of its industrial clusters, i.e., concentrations of infrastructure and organizations 
arising through a process of agglomeration over time. This concentration can act as an 
inducement for MNEs to invest. Through collaborative linkages with other firms within a cluster, 
MNEs can benefit from spillovers, gaining knowledge and accessing specialized labor markets 
(De Propris and Driffield, 2006; Porter, 2000). The physical proximity promotes learning and 
innovation as communication becomes extensive. In certain industries - including the automotive 
industry - product architecture means that a change in one component will lead to changes in 
others (Sturgeon et al., 2008). Participating in clusters allows coordination of changes to happen 
quickly and efficiently. MNEs also will be able to learn about the nature of local competition 
(Saxenian, 1994).  
From an institutional theory perspective, government policy will have a role to play in the 
development of advanced clusters in a host country. In this view, an MNE’s ownership decision 
is a response to isomorphic pressures in the external environment, including regulative aspects 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). MNEs yield to coercive pressures (Rodriguez et al., 
2005) to conform and align to host country policy with respect to clusters. Porter (2000) referred 
to the importance for governments to continually upgrade clusters, “removing obstacles, relaxing 
constraints, and eliminating inefficiencies that impede productivity and innovation in the cluster” 
(Porter, 2000: 26), and in so doing becoming “magnets for attracting foreign investment” (Porter, 
2000: 16). Given this core aim of government policy to establish and nurture clusters within its 
national borders (Casper, 2007), such cluster upgrading policy will be apparent to MNEs 
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considering investment in the country. Beyond regulative institutions, Casper (2007) showed the 
importance of social networks linking managers across organizations within clusters. This 
suggests normative institutions will encourage investing MNEs to seek network advantages 
using lower equity stakes. In other words, MNEs will be attentive to the norm that JVs will 
support complementarities, alignment of activities and coordination between members (Porter, 
2000). 
While the flow of geographically localized knowledge facilitates the growth of 
technologically specialized regions, scholars also have pointed out how firms in clusters may 
develop ‘pipelines’ with other non-local clusters and institutions in other countries (Bathelt et al., 
2004). Clusters can therefore have an ‘outward looking’ dimension with knowledge and 
resources flowing locally through ongoing informal personal interactions as well across clusters 
(Bathelt et al., 2004). Understanding the “different institutional regimes” (Bathelt et al., 2004: 
43) in different parts of the world where pipelines between clusters are connected will be a 
concern for an inwardly investing MNE. Using a lower equity stake and working with partners 
will allow the MNE to negotiate the complexity of this and to “develop a joint interpretive 
context in order to engage in interaction” (Bathelt et al., 2004: 43). From a resource-based 
perspective, we believe it is more likely the MNE will use a JV in host countries characterized by 
advanced cluster development and R&D collaborations in order to engage in knowledge and 
resource co-creation in both local cluster (e.g., Jaffe et al., 1993) and through these pipelines that 
clusters will inevitably form with other clusters in the world (Bathelt et al., 2004).  
 
Hypothesis 2:  
 
The greater the extent of well-developed clusters and R&D collaborations in a host country, the 
more likely a technology-intensive foreign MNE will (a) choose a JV over a WOS, and (b) will 
use a lower equity stake in any JV in the host country. 
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3.3 The host country as a recipient of inward technology FDI 
A technology-intensive MNE considering making an investment in a host country will 
also be faced with the possibility that the host country receives inward technology FDI from 
other MNEs from other countries. This can be as a direct consequence of the host country’s 
policies, particularly its demand-pull policies (Fabrizio et al., 2017). This increases the 
competitive threats facing the MNE in the host country and brings into sharp focus its need to 
protect its innovative assets as they are deployed to that country. 
 From an institutional theory perspective, a question arises relating to the legitimacy of a 
given MNE’s strategy in the country. Mimetic and normative isomorphic pressures to conform to 
what is acceptable in terms of inward FDI will be present. An MNE will consider it necessary to 
seek legitimacy in the host country by also pursuing a strategy in which the MNE brings its 
proprietary technology into the country. While the emphasis here may be on gaining influence 
over host country actors and securing long standing relationships and acceptance into the 
institutional environment of the host country, the MNE will nevertheless need to ensure that it 
has control of this process. A fully-controlled investment will allow technology to be transferred 
in an ordered manner consistent with the MNE’s overall strategy for asset protection. 
From a resource-based perspective, technology being transferred into a host country by 
other MNEs from other home countries may be considered a threat. A question arises for a given 
MNE regarding how to deal with this threat using its own assets, capabilities and know-how. It is 
more likely the MNE will need to transfer its own assets from other parts of its global 
organization in order to defend against the threat implied by other MNEs transferring their 
technology into the host country. Kogut and Zander’s (1993) seminal work showed the less 
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codifiable (and therefore more difficult to transfer) the knowledge, the more likely the 
knowledge will be transferred within the MNE using a WOS. Others have shown MNE 
proprietary assets to be linked with greater equity stakes (e.g., Mani et al., 2007). When the host 
country becomes a battle ground for competing MNE assets, a WOS can act as a competitive 
weapon, allowing proprietary knowledge to be deployed to the host country in a controlled way. 
Using a lower equity share (especially a minority stake) presents commercial risk in this line of 
thinking. Proprietary assets and technology can be lost through subtle forms of intellectual 
property (IP) infringement with partners eager to build their own asset bases. The MNE will be 
able to control its assets better through higher equity stakes (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007), and 
this will be useful if the MNE needs to re-allocate resources to the subsidiary as and when 
required given competitive moves by other MNEs. Furthermore, the MNE will be able to control 
its internal knowledge network more effectively when these are fully internalized through a 
WOS (Kogut and Zander, 1993). 
 
Hypothesis 3:  
 
The greater the extent that the host country is a recipient of technology through FDI, the more 
likely a technology-intensive foreign MNE will (a) choose a WOS over a JV, and (b) will use a 
higher equity stake in any JV in the host country. 
 
 
4. Methodology 
The sample were foreign direct investments made by MNEs in the automobile 
manufacturing industry listed on the Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX – German Stock Index) 
between 2005 and 2012. The parent companies were BMW, Daimler and Volkswagen. While 
Germany's economy is the largest in Europe and fourth largest by GDP in the world (Forbes, 
2015), Germany was the fifth largest outward investing economy in the world (OECD, 2013).  
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The automotive industry is particularly relevant for our study as it contains technology-
intensive firms, many of which are highly globalized. Commentators have observed how (1) 
global R&D spending in this industry increased from $70B in 2005 to $105B in 2014; (2) cars 
have become extremely high-tech, and R&D assets are needed for continuous product 
enhancements in transmission, fuel cells, sensors, entertainment, communication, advanced 
driver assistance systems (ADAS) and autonomous driving; (3) the industry has experienced 
improved innovation performance – with new product and service ideas meeting commercial 
goals (Strategy&, 2015). The automotive industry has been used in empirical studies in 
internationalization strategy in prior research (Belis-Bergouignan et al., 2000; Pfaffmann and 
Stephan, 2001; Yiu and Makino, 2002). Belis-Bergouignan et al. (2000) found European 
automobile manufacturers, including VW, to adopt strong hierarchical control, and singled out 
VW as a company seeking to become integrated on a world-wide basis. Similarly, Sturgeon et al. 
(2008) noted how the automotive industry historically had been vertically-integrated. 
Correspondingly, Yiu and Makino’s (2002) automobile sub-sample had a high percentage of 
fully owned (high control) investments. 
German regulations require stock-listed companies to issue a list of investments 
(Anteilsbesitzliste) annually, providing information on all material subsidiaries of the company. 
Using this list and cross-checking it with prior years, we hand-captured all new foreign entries of 
BMW, Daimler and Volkswagen in the eight years from 2005 through 2012, i.e., before and after 
the financial crisis. Scholars previously have used this list as a reliable source of data on FDI and 
MNE entry strategy (e.g., Hutzschenreuter et al., 2014; Schanz et al., 2017). We also reviewed 
the annual reports for these companies scanning for keywords such as “acquisition”, 
“investment”, “joint venture”, in order to ensure that no investments were missed or 
  
16 
misinterpreted. After removing some observations due to missing values on certain variables of 
interest, the final sample size was n=1324, corresponding to an average of 165.5 new foreign 
investments per year.2 These 1324 foreign direct investments covered 65 different countries. 
Tables 1 and 2 show the distribution of observations and characteristics of the MNEs, as well as 
the host countries in the sample according to their OECD membership. As indicated by Table 1, 
the R&D investments and patenting by these MNEs indicates they are all highly technology-
intensive, spending upwards of € 97.90 Billion collectively on R&D over the years of interest 
and filing upwards of 21,000 patents in that time. Table 2 shows a wide distribution of 
developing and developed countries in the sample. 
---------------------------------- 
Tables 1 and 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
4.1 Operationalization and model 
4.1.1 Dependent variables.  
Firstly, we captured the main ownership decision using the widely-applied mode 
operationalization: WOS (=1) where there was an equity stake >= 95% and JV (=0) where there 
was an equity stake less than 95%. Various thresholds for the cut-off point between full and 
shared ownership are used in the literature, including 51% equity stake (Filatotchev et al., 2008), 
80% (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004) and 90% (Demirbag et al., 2007; Dikova, and Van 
Witteloostuijn, 2007). Yiu and Makino (2002) ran tests at 80%, 95% and 100% levels. We 
employ a 95% cut off as this is most commonly used (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Chen and 
Hennart, 2002; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Hennart and Larimo, 1998; Makino and Beamish, 1998; 
Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998) but we also conducted robustness tests at other equity threshold 
                                                        
2 The distribution of observations over the eight years was as follows (number of observations and percent of total 
sample in parenthesis): 2005 (n=29, 2.2%), 2006 (n=102, 7.7%), 2007 (n=132, 10.0%), 2008 (n=225, 17.0%), 2009 
(n=59, 4.5%), 2010 (n=54, 4.1%), 2011 (n=551, 41.6%), 2012 (n=172, 13.0%). 
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levels (reported below). Secondly, we used the actual equity stake in additional tests to estimate 
effects on a continuous (right-censored) scale for JVs. The final dataset had 1185 observations 
classified as a WOS, and 139 classified as a JV. This distribution is expected with the large 
German automobile manufacturers in our sample and consistent with the argument that MNEs 
with high levels of technically sophisticated products and proprietary content will tend to choose 
a WOS in their overseas investments (Chen and Hennart, 2002; Delios and Henisz, 2003; Yiu 
and Makino, 2002). Indeed, in the 102 automotive companies in Yiu and Makino’s (2002) study, 
the mean equity ownership for overseas investments was 82%. At the 80% threshold, only 21 of 
the 102 observations were classified as JVs. This is very consistent with what we see for BMW 
and Daimler in our sample, although the mean equity stake made by Volkswagen was higher and 
more consistent with the Nissan (90.5%) and Mitsubishi Motors (99.5%) observations in Yiu and 
Makino’s (2000) study. 
4.1.2. Independent variables.  
We captured innovation output using host country patenting intensity; the total number of 
utility patents in each of the years, sourced from the World Intellectual Property Organization’s 
(WIPO) IP database. We transformed this variable using a natural log due to its skewed 
distribution across countries (Table 2). For indicators of clustering / R&D collaboration and 
inward technology FDI we used items from the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Executive 
Opinion survey for each of the years in the data. This survey is reported as the Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCR) and covers the vast majority of countries. For clustering, we used 
item 11.03 from the block on business sophistication. This item refers to the state of cluster 
development and asks respondents to indicate “how widespread are well-developed and deep 
clusters (geographic concentrations of firms, suppliers, producers of related products and 
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services, and specialized institutions in a particular field)?”, with possible responses between 1 
(non-existent) and 7 (widespread in many fields). For inward technology FDI, we used item 9.03 
from the block on technological readiness. This item asks “To what extent does foreign direct 
investment (FDI) bring new technology into your country?”, with responses between 1 (not at 
all) and 7 (to a great extent – FDI is a key source of new technology). 
4.1.3 Control variables.  
We used sixteen control variables. At the host-country level we controlled for: (1) market 
size, as this may indicate demand for a market-seeking MNE (Gomes-Casseres, 1990) and 
exploitation-oriented investments (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007); (2) economic development 
using the natural log of the country’s GDP per capita in U.S. dollars and purchasing-power parity 
(Vaaler and Schrage, 2009); (3) levels of political hazard and uncertainty in the host country 
using Henisz’ political constraints measure (a higher value indicating more veto points amongst 
the host country’s executive and less political uncertainty) (Henisz, 2000); (4) cultural distance, 
given that this has been shown to be a source of risk that can impact ownership choices (Hennart 
and Larimo, 1998; López-Duarte and Vidal-Suárez, 2013). At firm level, we controlled for 
differences between the three parents using dichotomous dummy variables for each parent. Prior 
research on ownership has included year of establishment as a fixed effect (Mani et al., 2007). 
We also included year dichotomous dummies (eight year dummies). Pooling data across time 
and MNE in studies of ownership is not uncommon in the MNE entry strategy literature (e.g., 
Chen and Hennart, 2002; Delios and Beamish, 1999; López-Duarte and Vidal-Suárez, 2013; 
Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998; Talay and Cavusgil, 2009; Williams et al., 2017). Finally, we 
controlled for prior recent experience of the MNE in the host country indicated by a separate 
investment by that MNE in that country in any given prior year in the time frame of the study 
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(Delios and Beamish, 1999). Again, this is commonly seen in studies on ownership mode and 
equity stake, accounting for the possibility that the ownership decision is in part determined by 
learning from previous FDI by the MNE into the host country (Mani et al., 2007; Williams et al., 
2017). We used a dichotomous dummy variable for this. Table 3 shows all variables in terms of 
their definitions and measurement. 
---------------------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 We applied a Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test to assess the validity of using 
panel estimation. The result of the Chi-square test was not significant and we do not reject the 
null hypothesis that pooled analysis is appropriate. As commonly used in the entry strategy 
literature, we used a binary logistic regression to test hypotheses H1(a), H2(a) and H3(a). As the 
dependent variable was a dichotomous variable (WOS=1, JV=0), the probability of the MNE 
choosing a WOS over a JV is expressed as: 
 
𝑃(MODE = WOS) =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝑡
 
 
where t is the linear function: t = 𝛼 + 𝑥i 𝛽, and 𝛽 represents the regression coefficients for 
control and independent variables described above. We also ran TOBIT models (e.g., Delios and 
Beamish, 1999) with equity stake right-censored at 95% as the dependent variable to test 
hypotheses H1(b), H2(b) and H3(b). 
 
4.2 Quality and robustness tests 
Firstly, for our main ownership mode tests we ensured the assumptions for binomial regression 
were not violated, namely that the dependent variable was dichotomous, independent variables 
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were continuous or categorical (for year and company dummies), observations were independent 
and the dependent variable had mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. We ran the Box-
Tidwell (1962) test to test for linear relationship between continuous independent variables and 
ownership mode. This procedure entailed computing the natural log of each continuous 
predictor, and including interactions between each predictor and its natural log. None of these 
interactions were significant. Secondly, we checked the Hosmer–Lemeshow statistic for all 
binary logistic models and found in each case that Chi-square not significant (p<0.05). This 
supported a null hypothesis that observed and expected values were the same across all cases in 
each test. Thirdly, we examined the classification table for each logit model and found the 
percentage of cases correctly classified to range between 88% and 92%. These were very 
acceptable, being comparable or higher than those reported in prior ownership mode studies 
(Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998). Fourthly, we ran models with the VW observations excluded. 
We did this because of potential bias in VW’s investment strategy towards WOS linked to the 
company’s emissions cheating software scandal. In 2015, VW had admitted they knowingly 
cheated emissions tests on their diesel vehicles by installing secretive “defeat devices”, allowing 
the company to pass regulatory tests while actually emitting much higher levels of hazardous 
gases (Lynch, Cutro and Bird, 2016). Fifthly, we replaced the three main independent variables 
with alternative proxies. We used item 9.01 from the WEF’s GCR report, availability of latest 
technologies as a proxy for innovation output of the host country. Item 12.04, university-industry 
collaboration in R&D was used as an alternative proxy for host country clustering and R&D 
collaborations. Item 9.02, which captures the extent to which host country businesses adopt new 
technology as a proxy for inward technology transfer, reflecting the absorption side of 
technology transfer within the host country. We also replaced the dependent variable with 
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dichotomous ones capturing equity stake at 80% and greater (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004) and 
51% and greater (Filatotchev et al., 2008) respectively. In each case, we ran models with all three 
of the main independent variables and all three of the alternative independent variables.  
Finally, we collected additional secondary data to examine 9 of the investments (3 for 
each MNE at lower and higher levels of equity stake) in greater detail. We looked at investments 
in Kringlan (Switzerland), ParkatmyHouse (UK) and Sauber Aerodynamik (Switzerland) for 
BMW, Icelandic New Energy (Iceland), STARCAM (Czech Republic) and MB SIM Technology 
(China) for Daimler, and TTTech Computertechnik (Austria), Cummins-Scania high pressure 
injection (USA) and Mälardalens Teknikgymnasium (Sweden) for VW. In each case we 
identified the motive and opportunity for the investment and examined the extent to which 
evidence linked the case to our variables of interest. 
 
5. Results 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics and bi-variate correlations among variables of 
interest. Results indicate the WOS choice to be negatively correlated with innovation output (r=-
0.16, p=0.001) and clustering (r=-0.14, p<0.001), in line with our predictions. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of cases grouped by ownership mode. The JV group has a tendency towards higher 
innovation output and clustering and the mean differences are positive and significant for these 
two groups. Cultural distance is negatively correlated with host country GDP per capita (r=-0.44, 
p<0.001), indicative of investments made by German automobile manufacturers in China, India 
and Indonesia that were culturally distant but still in economic transition (Table 2). This 
coefficient is very similar to that reported in Talay and Cavusgil (2009) who reported an r=-
0.466 between cultural distance and GDP per capita on a sample of automotive firms’ 
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international investments. As expected, we see host country economic development to be 
positively correlated with cluster development (r=0.52, p<0.001). Innovation output is negatively 
correlated with inward technology FDI (r=-0.11, p<0.001), a possible indication of a host 
country’s reliance on importing technology from foreign MNEs where the national innovation 
system is weak or emerging. As expected, we see POLCON to be positively correlated with 
economic development (r=0.61, p<0.001). 
---------------------------------- 
Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------- 
---------------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
In the main logistic regression models (Table 5), none of the control variables are 
consistently significant across all models. The weakness in the effect of cultural distance in our 
sample supports the absence of this effect in Talay and Cavusgil’s (2009) study of IJV formation 
in the automobile industry. However, it contradicts the effects found in other ownership studies 
(e.g., Hennart and Larimo, 1998; López-Duarte and Vidal-Suárez, 2013). Predictions are 
partially supported for innovation output (H1(a)), fully supported for clustering (H2(a)), and 
partially supported for inward technology FDI (H3(a)). Innovation output has the anticipated 
negative sign but is only significant (p<0.05) in the VW-excluded model. The coefficient for 
clustering is negative and significant when entered separately and in the final model. It is also 
negative and significant for the VW-excluded model (Model 6) (p<0.001). Inward technology 
FDI is not significant when entered separately but is positive (p<0.05) in the final model. 
However, it drops out of significance for the VW-excluded model. The TOBIT analysis in Table 
6 provides strong support to H2(b), with the coefficient being negative and significant 
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throughout. Echoing the LOGIT models, there is only partial support for H1(b) and H3(b); signs 
are as predicted.  
Robustness tests in Table 7 show availability of latest technologies and university – 
industry collaboration in R&D in host countries both give negative and significant coefficients, 
indicating preference for JV over WOS, when entered alone. University-industry collaboration in 
R&D is negative (p<0.1) for the VW-excluded model (Model 5 in Table 7). Similarly, the 
TOBIT analysis in Table 8 reveals negative coefficients for availability of latest technologies 
(p<0.05 in Model 1) and university – industry collaboration in R&D (p<0.1 in Model 5). For 
models with lower equity thresholds for ownership mode (Table 9), innovation output and 
clustering retain their negative signs, although clustering has a stronger coefficient and is 
consistently significant. Inward technology FDI increases the likelihood of WOS at the 80% 
threshold. Availability of latest technologies and university – industry collaboration in R&D 
have negative signs but only the former is significant at the 10% level for the 51% equity model. 
Host country firm technology absorption is not significant.  
---------------------------------- 
Tables 5 - 9 about here 
---------------------------------- 
A summary of our case analysis is shown in Appendix B. For BMW, in the low equity 
stakes in Kringlan (Switzerland) and ParkatmyHouse (UK) the company was in an explorative 
mode. Kringlan was a specialized materials producer, with on-going collaborations in various 
industries, including automotive. The opportunity for BMW was for composite wheels to replace 
steel wheels and reduce the weight of vehicles. The investment aimed to develop capability in a 
country where patents would be protected and where any risks due to the partner’s collaboration 
with other companies could be minimized. ParkatmyHouse was a website aimed to match people 
wanting to rent out their driveways with drivers looking for a space to park, for a fee. The 
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ParkatmyHouse JV explored ways in which BMW could help them in developing the website for 
use in other markets, such as the US. Innovative mobility solutions with sustainability was a core 
focus. In the Kringlan and ParkatmyHouse investments, BMW valued the benefits of clustering 
and collaborations in R&D for exploring these new technological opportunities. With the Sauber 
investment in Switzerland, BMW aimed to use the JV as a testing ground for new technologies. 
However, Sauber had previously worked with various other engine manufacturers. The need to 
control the outcomes of R&D collaboration with Sauber encouraged the higher equity stake. 
While learning was clearly an important factor, there was more of an exploitative element to the 
investment compared with Kringlan and ParkatmyHouse, with return on investment expected in 
a shorter timeframe. The greater Zurich area, where Kringlan and Sauber were situated, has 
become a prominent knowledge-intensive cluster, particularly in ICT.  
For Daimler, the low equity stakes in Icelandic New Energy (INE) (Iceland) and 
STARCAM (Czech Republic) were aimed at exploring new technological domains, although the 
STARCAM investment was more of an exploitative nature. INE was created following a host 
country government decision to find new ways to shift from fossil fuels in transport to hydrogen 
(technology that Daimler had used in its Citaro bus range). Iceland was at the forefront of 
alternative energy development. INE acted as a research body, as well as an advisor to 
government policies, a networking hub, university partner in joint research projects, applying its 
knowledge and network base also in the marine and aerospace industries. Iceland’s clusters did 
not comprise solely industries and institutions within its borders, they also spanned Nordic 
neighbors such as Denmark, Sweden and Norway. INE also coordinated another cluster - Græna 
Orkan (Ecoenergy) - having an even closer relationship with government stakeholders 
responsible for environmental reforms. In the case of STARCAM, the Czech Republic had pre-
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existing established automotive clusters (such the Moravian-Silesian Automotive Cluster) 
administered at Podnikatelský inkubátor VŠB-TU Ostrava (Technical University of Ostrava). 
STARCAM, however, was situated in Most, in the west of the country, closer to Germany, and 
was a manufacturer of aluminum components, including heads and engine blocks. Most had a 
large cluster of suppliers to the automotive industry, including glass producer AGC and tire 
manufacturer Continental. The majority control stake in STARCAM is consistent with an entry 
strategy to control proprietary assets given the presence of other automotive players in close 
proximity. In the case of MB SIM Tech (China) for Daimler, we see a greater exploitative 
element and a majority stake. MB SIM Tech had strong competences in vehicle design, 
powertrain and electronic solutions. Given China was set to become the 2nd biggest market for 
Daimler by 2020, the majority stake allowed the company to use knowledge and insights form 
that market to direct R&D activity. 
For VW, TTTech Computertechnik (Austria) and Cummins-Scania high pressure 
injection (USA) investments, both low equity stakes, were highly explorative. TTTech was based 
in Vienna, a city with a strong cluster base for automotive R&D. The JV aimed to develop 
technology in driver safety, piloted driving and vehicle systems reliability. Austria had a world-
class automotive technology industry, with, on average 1.4 patent applications submitted by the 
industry in Austria every day. However, TTTech was involved in a range of institutions and 
firms, not only in automotive, but also in other transportation and aerospace industries. In the 
minority stake in Cummins Scania (USA), VW had a mission to develop high pressure injection 
systems for Scania’s engines and technology to increase engine efficiency. Clustering was not as 
important in this case as Cummins’ pre-existing expertise and innovation output in this particular 
field. Having a sound IP protection regime to protect knowledge assets given the presence of all 
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other global competitors in the host country was also important. The Mälardalens 
Teknikgymnasium (Sweden) majority stake arose as a consequence of VW’s corporate 
acquisition of Scania and was a reflection of the corporate desire to exploit Scania’s asset base. 
This investment was a higher education institution dedicated to preparing future Scania 
employees and offering R&D support to Scania. The Teknikgymnasium was within walking 
distance of numerous Scania R&D centers, demonstration and industrial entities in Södertälje. 
Scania stated that Mälardalens Teknikgymnasium ensured a stable influx of highly skilled labor, 
already knowledgeable of Scania’s way of working. It enabled lower recruitment costs, made it 
faster to find workforce at a shorter notice, and ensured a stable “quality” of new recruits. 
Controlling this human capital supply system through a majority stake is consistent with the 
logic of protecting against knowledge loss and turnover of skilled staff to other companies in the 
host country.  
Overall, the robustness tests support the findings in Tables 5 and 6. The statistical tests 
consistently give similar profiles of coefficients. The selected cases illustrate strategic 
imperatives for equity levels in foreign investments and show lower equity levels in more 
explorative investments, and higher equity levels in more exploitative ones. Furthermore, in the 
nine cases we examined, there was no suggestion of cultural distance or political stability being 
directly related to the ownership decision. GDP growth and market size appeared to matter for 
Daimler’s majority stake in MB SIM Tech, but elsewhere these factors were not as important as 
the need to create new technological competence for the wider MNE by tapping into innovation 
outputs and clusters in host countries. 
In summary, findings indicate that host country R&D determinants matter to 
internationalization strategy of technology-intensive MNEs, and they matter more so than factors 
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traditionally used by scholars of MNE entry strategy. Furthermore, while different aspects of 
host country R&D will influence internationalization strategy in different ways, clustering 
emerges as the most consistent host country R&D determinant of ownership decisions made by 
the technology-intensive MNE.  
 
6. Discussion  
The present study was motivated by two observations. The first of these was the growing 
importance of globalized R&D as well as the prevalence of technology-intensive MNEs in the 
global economy. The second was that, despite extensive research on MNE internationalization, 
there is limited empirical work on how host country R&D influences MNE entry strategy. Host 
country R&D matters to entry strategy because of its importance as a source of learning for the 
MNE and as a source of assets that can be bundled with MNE assets (e.g., Hennart, 2009; 
Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998). This is particularly salient for technology-intensive MNEs 
seeking to benefit from tacit and intangible location advantages (Meyer et al., 2009). Precisely 
how they matter in specific technology-intensive industries has not been established in prior 
research. While some entry strategy research has touched on the role played by host country 
R&D (Mutinelli and Piscitello, 1998), most influential research does not consider host country 
R&D determinants explicitly, focusing instead on institutions, firm and industry characteristics, 
and various distances and sources of uncertainty and risk (e.g., Berry et al., 2010; Chen and 
Hennart, 2002; Delios and Henisz, 2003; Dikova, and Van Witteloostuijn, 2007; Filatotchev et 
al., 2008; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Hennart and Larimo, 1998; López-Duarte and Vidal-
Suárez, 2013; Makino and Neupert, 2000; Yiu and Makino, 2002). Entry strategy literature that 
does consider R&D does so from a firm-centric perspective, e.g., in terms of a firm’s R&D 
intensity or asset specificity (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Canabal and White, 2008; Dikova, 
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and Van Witteloostuijn, 2007) or as an intensity variable distributed unequally across 
subsidiaries (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005). Our perspective differs as we consider host country 
R&D as part of the opportunity space in a specific industry. This opportunity space is 
multidimensional and its features differ by country.  
Our analysis diverges from prior studies because we put an explicit focus on host-country 
R&D determinants of the ownership decision, and highlight how different aspects of host 
country R&D will be salient. Findings are reinforced through various tests that control for 
locational characteristics and different operationalization. Case examples illustrate the foreign 
engagement of our sample companies in R&D and these reinforce the patterns we find in 
regression models. Such case examples are not commonly shown alongside large sample models 
in the MNE entry strategy literature and we think these can help interpreting the results.  
 There are three sets of contributions from the analysis. Firstly, we add to literature on 
location advantages and how these matter in determining entry strategy of technology-intensive 
MNEs. We extend earlier work on location advantages that considered market size and 
uncertainties (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992; Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Dunning, 1998, 
2000), and highlight how host country R&D represents technological opportunity for foreign 
MNEs. Note the case examples in Appendix B in support of this. Host country technological 
opportunity has been somewhat neglected in entry strategy research in favor of firm-centric and 
risk-related characteristics of host countries. We put a more explicit focus on host country R&D 
determinants and show how these matter in different ways to the ownership aspect of entry 
strategy. 
Secondly, the results show how institutional theory and resource-based explanations 
relate to entry strategy of technology-intensive MNEs in the modern era. In countries where 
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innovation output and clustering are deemed location advantages, behavioral and contextual 
uncertainty are not as important to our understanding of MNE internationalization as institutional 
conformity and knowledge seeking logics. While this may reflect our focus on MNEs whose 
technology-intensity is indicative of high levels of proprietary knowledge, the fact that this 
knowledge may be put at risk in such host countries raises questions for transaction cost 
explanations of entry strategy. As indicated by the cases, international JVs by technology-
intensive MNEs can be used to gain legitimacy, seek out new knowledge, and engage in 
explorative research. We see this very clearly in the Kringlan, ParkatmyHouse and Sauber 
investments for BMW, the INE and STARCAM investments for Daimler, and the TTTech 
Computertechnik and Cummins-Scania high pressure injection investments for VW. These 
partners all also collaborate with other institutions and firms in other industries (e.g., INE and 
TTTech), and some have had links with other competitors in the automotive industry (Sauber 
and STARCAM). Investing MNEs would appear to put the value of exploring new technological 
opportunities above the costs associated with behavioral concerns. In this sense our study of 
technology-intensive MNEs provides support to scholars (e.g., Mani et al., 2007) who find the 
influence of transaction cost considerations on ownership to be modest. 
Thirdly, the study provides insight into internationalization in the automotive industry. 
Scholars have called for industry-specific samples in studies on MNE internationalization 
(Brouthers and Hennart, 2007). The automotive industry is a global one, increasingly driven by 
R&D in areas such as transmission, fuel cells, sensors, entertainment, communication, ADAS 
and autonomous driving (as well as related areas such as those shown in Appendix B). In our 
sample alone, nearly € 100 Billion was spent on R&D by the parent companies over an 8 year 
period. Findings provide reasons why MNEs in this industry seek JVs as they expand, despite 
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their formidable firm-specific advantages in innovation. In this industry, we see the development 
of clustering and R&D collaborations in host countries influencing JV choice, and for choosing a 
lower equity stake within a JV. Innovation output and inward tech FDI into a host country also 
matter but to a lesser extent. Other R&D factors, such as technology absorption, have little 
impact on the ownership decision. Taken collectively, this is interesting because it shows us how 
this particular global industry is forward-thinking (i.e., has a ‘future-orientation’) in terms of how 
it sees location advantages in host countries. Examples that reinforce this point include Kringlan 
and ParkatmyHouse for BMW, INE and MB SIM Tech for Daimler and TTTech for VW. Host 
country clustering and R&D collaborations have future potential in the eyes of large, technology-
intensive firms competing in this industry. Previously registered patents and innovation output 
that occurred in prior years represent efforts of the past: a ‘past-orientation’. While these do 
matter, they may not reflect what firms believe could happen in the future by engaging in cluster-
abundant environments through JVs. 
 Our study has a number of implications for managers and policy-makers in host countries 
seeking to attract inward FDI. For MNE managers, an appropriate level of equity for new 
overseas investments matters as the investment becomes an important source of learning and 
asset augmentation. Managers will need to understand the nature of the R&D environment in 
host countries as a part of this decision-making process. Findings also stress the need to develop 
partnering capabilities for JVs in countries where clustering and innovation networks are 
advanced. Partnering capability involves identifying and evaluating partners, negotiating and 
formalizing contracts, as well as the ongoing management of relationships in host countries. 
Knowledge management systems can be used by the MNE to capture and share knowledge as the 
company learns and explores through JVs. Mechanisms to rotate engineers and technicians 
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between JV partners also will help with knowledge transfer; we see this in the case of BMW’s 
investment in Sauber.  
In terms of host country government policy, findings suggest conditions under which host 
countries can encourage foreign MNEs to seek JVs in their jurisdiction. Host countries may 
prefer to encourage JVs with foreign technology-intensive MNEs in order to boost the economy 
through spillover benefits. With high levels of clustering and R&D collaboration, and with 
proven innovation outputs, the host country is more likely to achieve this, even with foreign 
MNEs that traditionally had a tendency for WOS, such as in the automotive industry. Host 
country governments can provide reassurance on concerns that MNEs might have with JVs, by 
offering a set of location advantages based on R&D characteristics that helps the MNE to 
overcome any perceived risks. 
The present study comes with a number of limitations, and also raises fresh research 
questions. In terms of limitations, firstly, the findings are limited to one home country and large, 
highly internationalized firms from one industry. We caution against generalizing to other 
countries and industries. Secondly, we did not look at establishment mode, the choice between 
acquisition and Greenfield, and we did not look at non-equity modes such as licensing and 
franchising. This may limit the interpretations in terms of wider implications for 
internationalization amidst globalized R&D. Thirdly, we were limited in terms of our use of 
indicators from secondary sources, including WIPO, World Bank and WEF sources. We could 
not tap into the depth of managerial and organizational dynamics for all investments. We also 
limited our focus to three areas of R&D characteristics in a host country: the country as a 
generator of innovation, as a domain for clustering, and as a recipient of inward FDI in 
technology. There are other dimensions of host country R&D that can be used in future work.  
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We believe MNE researchers should include host country R&D determinants more 
prominently, especially when researching industries where globalized R&D is important for 
competitive advantage. Researchers could note our findings that different dimensions of host 
country R&D will have different effects on entry strategy. A more nuanced approach going 
beyond rather top-level locational advantages is therefore needed, looking at innovation inputs 
and outputs, and future-oriented technological opportunities versus past-oriented innovation 
performance. Finally, we suggest future research could study the phenomenon of MNE entry 
strategy from the point of view of the host country R&D, examining the role played by 
government policy and R&D institutions on MNE investment using a range of indicators, 
including non-equity modes and the establishment mode choice. We hope these 
recommendations and the analysis in the present study will allow future work to provide greater 
insight into host country R&D determinants of MNE strategy. 
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Table 1 
Sample characteristics by MNE 
 
MNE Number of 
observations in 
sample (2005-
2012) 
Of which were IJVs 
(95% equity threshold) 
Total R&D spend 2005-
2012 (intensity - 
annualized 2005-2012) 
 
Patents filed (total 
2006-2012) 
(dpma.de) 
BMW 58 12 (20.7%) € 27.95 Billion (5.5%) 4,597 
Daimler 302 77 (25.5%) € 44.64 Billion (4.9%) 11,799 
Volkswagen 964 50 (5.2%) € 25.31 Billion (4.6%) 4,980 
     
Total 1324 139 (10.5%) € 97.90 Billion 21,376 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Host countries in the sample 
 
Non-OECD (n=33) OECD (n=32) 
Albania, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia,  
Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Panama, 
Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, UAE, 
Ukraine, Uruguay 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, USA 
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Table 3 
Data variables, measurements, definitions and sources 
 
Variable / Type Measurement Definition Source 
Ownership mode / 
Dependent 
1 = WOS  
0 = JV 
Parent firm's ownership arrangement in 
foreign direct investment:  WOS =  >95%; 
JV = <95% 
DAX-listed car manufacturers yearly list of 
Investments per year 
Population/Control Log of host country population  The size of the host country’s market in 
terms of its population 
World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/) 
GDP per 
capita/Control 
Log of gross domestic product/population Economic development of host country World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/) 
POLCON/Control Political constraints in terms of the number 
of veto points. 
Feasibility of a change in policy given the 
structure of a nation’s political institutions  
Henisz (2010) 
Cultural 
distance/Control 
Summed squares of the variance between 
host country and Germany 
National cultural differences between a 
home and host country  
Hofstede (1980); Kogut & Singh (1988) 
Host experience 1 = prior recent investment 
0 = no prior recent investment 
MNE experience in the host country in a 
previous year within the dataset timeframe 
DAX-listed car manufacturers yearly list of 
Investments per year 
Innovation output / 
Independent 
Natural log of total patent applications in a 
given year 
National patenting intensity World Intellectual Property Organization 
(http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/) 
Clustering/ 
Independent 
Item 11.03 in the Global Competitiveness 
Report 
Extent to which well-developed and deep 
clusters are widespread (geographic 
concentrations of firms, suppliers, producers, 
institutions) 
World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion 
Surveys (2005-2012) 
Tech FDI / 
Independent 
Item 9.03 in the Global Competitiveness 
Report 
Extent to which FDI brings new technology 
into the host country 
World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion 
Surveys (2005-2012) 
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Table 4 
Correlations and descriptive information 
 
+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
N=1324 
  
 
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Ownership mode 0.90 0.31 
 
       
2. Innovation output 9.21 2.06 -0.16***        
3. Clustering 4.36 0.67 -0.14*** 0.44***       
4. Tech FDI 4.96 0.43 0.01 -0.11*** 0.28***      
5. Population (ln) 17.55 1.50 -0.14*** 0.87*** 0.18*** -0.24***     
6. GDP per capita (ln) 10.11 0.94 0.02 -0.02 0.52*** 0.28*** -0.38***    
7. POLCON 0.70 0.20 0.02 -0.19*** 0.25*** 0.27*** -0.37*** 0.61***   
8. Cultural distance 1.37 0.96 0.07* -0.19*** -0.31*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.44*** -0.47***  
9. Host experience 0.85 0.67 -0.02 0.12*** 0.10*** -0.02 0.12*** 0.04 0.10*** -0.08** 
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Table 5 
LOGIT results (WOS=1, threshold 95%) 
 
 
Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Population (ln) 
 -0.13 
(0.08) 
0.16 
(0.20) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
-0.12 
(0.08) 
0.30 
(0.21) 
0.75* 
(0.31) 
GDP per capita (ln) 
 -0.03 
(0.14) 
0.18 
(0.19) 
0.30+ 
(0.17) 
-0.02 
(0.14) 
0.48* 
(0.21) 
0.67* 
(0.34) 
POLCON 
 0.74 
(0.65) 
0.69 
(0.64) 
1.03 
(0.64) 
0.62 
(0.66) 
0.76 
(0.65) 
2.14* 
(1.02) 
Cultural Distance 
 0.17 
(0.15) 
0.19 
(0.15) 
0.21 
(0.14) 
0.17 
(0.15) 
0.21 
(0.14) 
0.43+ 
(0.23) 
Year dummies (x 8) 
 
Included Included Included Included Included  Included  
Company dummies (x 3) 
 
Included Included Included Included Included 2 dummies 
Host experience 
 -0.22+ 
(0.13) 
-0.22+ 
(0.12) 
-0.20 
(0.12) 
-0.22+ 
(0.14) 
-0.20+ 
(0.12) 
-0.11 
(0.41) 
Innovation output  
(patents) 
-  
 
-0.20 (p=0.12) 
(0.13) 
  
-0.15 
(0.14) 
-0.41* 
(0.19) 
Clustering 
(state of development) 
- 
  
-0.80*** 
(0.22) 
 
-0.85*** 
(0.23) 
-1.21*** 
(0.38) 
Tech FDI  
(inward) 
+ 
   
0.25 
(0.27) 
0.53* 
(0.27) 
0.42 
(0.45) 
Constant 
 5.27* 
(2.40) 
0.05 
(4.15) 
2.38 
(2.50) 
3.86 
(2.82) 
-4.55 
(4.69) 
-12.23 
(7.50) 
-2 log likelihood 
 
749.33 747.06 735.94 748.48 731.54 342.78 
Pseudo-R2 (Nagelkerke) 
 
0.21 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.23 
+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
N=1324 except Model 6 (excluding VW) which has N=360 
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Table 6 
TOBIT results for equity stake (right-censored at 95% equity) 
 
 
Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Population (ln) 
 -0.05 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.24* 
(0.10) 
GDP per capita (ln) 
 -0.00 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.07) 
0.10 
(0.06) 
-0.00 
(0.06) 
0.15* 
(0.08) 
0.21+ 
(0.11) 
POLCON 
 0.20 
(0.25) 
0.19 
(0.26) 
0.28 
(0.23) 
0.16 
(0.25) 
0.20 
(0.24) 
0.59+ 
(0.33) 
Cultural Distance 
 0.05 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.11 
(0.08) 
Year dummies (x 8) 
 
Included Included Included Included Included  Included  
Company dummies (x 3) 
 
Included Included Included Included Included 2 dummies 
Host experience 
 -0.06** 
(0.02) 
-0.06** 
(0.02) 
-0.06** 
(0.02) 
-0.06** 
(0.02) 
-0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.13) 
Innovation output  
(patents) 
-  
 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
  
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.14* 
(0.06) 
Clustering 
(state of development) 
- 
  
-0.25** 
(0.08) 
 
-0.27*** 
(0.08) 
-0.36** 
(0.13) 
Tech FDI  
(inward) 
+ 
   
0.08 
(0.10) 
0.17+ 
(0.10) 
0.10 
(0.16) 
Constant 
 2.96*** 
(0.91) 
1.45 
(1.52) 
2.05* 
(0.92) 
2.51 
(1.07) 
0.43 
(1.46) 
-2.76 
(2.48) 
Log pseudolikelihood 
 
-398.83 -398.14 -393.80 -398.45 -392.07 -184.89 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.13 
+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
139 uncensored observations except Model 6 (excluding VW) which has 89 uncensored observations 
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Table 7 
LOGIT robustness tests (alternative proxies for independent variables) (WOS=1, threshold 95%) 
 
 
Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Population (ln) 
 -0.05 
(0.08) 
-0.06 
(0.08) 
-0.13 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
GDP per capita (ln) 
 0.25 
(0.19) 
0.17 
(0.17) 
-0.04 
(0.14) 
0.29 
(0.19) 
0.36 
(0.29) 
POLCON 
 1.50* 
(0.73) 
0.89 
(0.65) 
0.71 
(0.65) 
1.40+ 
(0.76) 
2.34* 
(1.14) 
Cultural Distance 
 0.23 
(0.15) 
0.20 
(0.15) 
0.17 
(0.15) 
0.23 
(0.15) 
0.34 
(0.23) 
Year dummies (x 8) 
 
Included Included Included Included Included  
Company dummies (x 3) 
 
Included Included Included Included 2 dummies 
Host experience 
 -0.19 
(0.12) 
-0.20+ 
(0.12) 
-0.22+ 
(0.13) 
-0.19 
(0.12) 
0.01 
(0.41) 
Innovation output  
(latest technology) 
-  -0.48* 
(0.22) 
  
-0.45 
(0.32) 
-0.35 
(0.45) 
Clustering 
 (univ. – industry collab.) 
- 
 
-0.30+ 
(0.16) 
 
-0.15 
(0.22) 
-0.66+ 
(0.39) 
Tech FDI 
(absorption) 
+ 
  
0.03 
(0.06) 
0.13 
(0.21) 
0.06 
(0.22) 
Constant 
 4.17 
(2.56) 
3.42 
(2.54) 
5.26* 
(2.40) 
2.60 
(2.60) 
0.18 
(3.83) 
-2 log likelihood 
 
744.40 745.84 749.01 742.82 350.82 
Pseudo-R2 (Nagelkerke) 
 
0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.20 
+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
N=1324 except Model 5 (excluding VW) which has N=360 
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Table 8 
TOBIT robustness tests (alternative proxies for independent variables, right-censored at 95% equity) 
 
 
Prediction Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Population (ln) 
 -0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
GDP per capita (ln) 
 0.09 
(0.07) 
0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.004 
(0.05) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.11 
(0.10) 
POLCON 
 0.42 
(0.26) 
0.24 
(0.24) 
0.18 
(0.24) 
0.42 
(0.29) 
0.66 
(0.42) 
Cultural Distance 
 0.07 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.08) 
Year dummies (x 8) 
 
Included Included Included Included Included 
Company dummies (x 3) 
 
Included Included Included Included 2 dummies 
Host experience 
 -0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.06+ 
(0.03) 
-0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.14) 
Innovation output  
(latest technology) 
-  -0.15* 
(0.07) 
  
-0.18 (p=0.11) 
(0.11) 
-0.12 
(0.16) 
Clustering 
 (univ. – industry collab.) 
- 
 
-0.08 (p=0.16) 
(0.06) 
 
-0.02 
(0.08) 
-0.20+ 
(0.12) 
Tech FDI 
(absorption) 
+ 
  
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Constant 
 1.84* 
(0.94) 
2.01* 
(0.95) 
2.44** 
(0.90) 
1.68+ 
(0.99) 
1.18 
(1.25) 
Log pseudolikelihood 
 
-396.90 -397.87 -398.63 -396.17 -188.38 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.11 
+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
139 uncensored observations except Model 6 (excluding VW) which has 89 uncensored observations 
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Table 9 
LOGIT robustness tests (ownership mode at 51% and 80% equity threshold) 
 
Prediction 
Model 1 
51% 
Model 2 
80% 
Model 3 
51% 
Model 4 
80% 
Population (ln) 
 0.30 
(0.27) 
0.33 
(0.22) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
GDP per capita (ln) 
 0.15 
(0.28) 
0.49* 
(0.22) 
0.11 
(0.25) 
0.31 
(0.20) 
POLCON 
 1.69* 
(0.86) 
0.39 
(0.66) 
2.92** 
(1.00) 
1.02 
(0.78) 
Cultural Distance 
 0.29 
(0.19) 
0.14 
(0.15) 
0.37+ 
(0.20) 
0.15 
(0.15) 
Year dummies (x 8) 
 
Included Included Included Included 
Company dummies (x 3)  Included Included Included Included 
Host experience 
 -0.26* 
(0.12) 
-0.23 
(0.15) 
-0.24* 
(0.12) 
-0.22 
(0.14) 
Innovation output  
(patents) 
- 
-0.22  
(0.17) 
-0.22 (p=0.12) 
(0.14) 
  
Clustering 
(state of development) 
- 
-0.65* 
(0.28) 
-0.77*** 
(0.23) 
  
Tech FDI  
(inward) 
+ 
0.28 
(0.36) 
0.46+ 
(0.28) 
  
Innovation output  
(latest technology) 
-   
-0.78+ 
(0.43) 
-0.42 
(0.33) 
Clustering 
(univ. – industry collab.) 
-   
-0.08 
(0.27) 
-0.25 
(0.23) 
Tech FDI 
(absorption) 
+   
0.10 
(0.35) 
0.12 
(0.21) 
Constant 
 -0.12 
(0.36) 
-4.26 
(4.81) 
6.40+ 
(3.31) 
3.62 
(2.71) 
-2 log likelihood 
 
536.68 706.13 537.32 713.84 
Pseudo-R2 (Nagelkerke)  0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 
+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
N=1324 
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Figure 1 
Dot plots for host country innovation output, clustering and inward tech FDI by MNE ownership mode (WOS=1) 
 
 
 
Equality of means:  
Innovation Output: t=5.74 p<0.001, mean difference = 1.05 
Clustering: t = 5.09, p<0.001, mean difference = 0.30 
Inward Tech FDI: t = -0.47, not significant 
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APPENDIX A - Summary of predictions 
 
Host Country R&D 
Characteristic 
Institution-based Logic Resource-based Logic Prediction 
Host country as a 
generator of 
innovation 
High levels of patenting indicate strong 
institutions and reliable IP protection 
regimes. High levels of trust in governance 
quality mitigate risks of JVs. Normative 
institutions encouraging the MNE to engage 
in innovative activity with partners who 
have fresh ideas and different insights on 
how to solve problems. 
 
Foreign technology-intensive MNEs 
can tap into the innovation outputs of 
the host country and it is appropriate to 
do this with exploratory, low equity 
modes. These will allow knowledge 
and intangible assets to flow into the 
MNE while mitigating commercial 
risk related to emerging technologies 
that are not yet commercialized. 
JV over WOS 
Lower equity stake within any JV 
Host country as a 
domain for 
clustering and R&D 
collaboration 
Government policy promotes clusters and 
encourages them to be nurtured and 
upgraded. Legitimacy will be achieved for 
the MNE through adherence to the 
expectation that the MNE will participate in 
clusters on joint development. JVs are an 
indication of long-term commitment to 
collaboration. 
Clusters provide localized 
agglomeration of resources through 
which JVs and lower equity stakes 
permit access. Evaluation of emerging 
technologies in clusters is achieved 
through closely working with partners 
jointly committed to developing new 
assets. 
JV over WOS 
Lower equity stake within any JV 
Host country as a 
recipient of inward 
technology FDI 
Other MNEs from around the world diffuse 
their technology into the host country. To 
be legitimate the MNE should do the same 
(mimetic isomorphism) and the need to 
protect proprietary assets while doing this 
will mean a greater likelihood of WOS. 
New technology entering the host 
country could be a threat to the MNE. 
Using a WOS for full control allows 
the MNE to protect its own assets and 
adopt a defensive position. If an MNE 
wanted to augment its asset base with 
technology from another MNE, it 
would not necessarily need to do this 
in a specific host country. 
WOS over JV 
Higher equity stake within any JV 
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APPENDIX B – Interpreted relevance of host country R&D determinants in selected cases  
 
MNE 
Host 
Country 
Investment / stake / opportunity 
Exploration: 
innovation 
output 
Exploration: 
clusters and 
collaboration 
Exploitation and 
presence of inward 
tech FDI  
BMW Switzerland Kringlan / 17.51% / access to composite 
material technology for application in car wheels ** *** * 
BMW UK ParkatmyHouse / 25.1% / access to app to for 
expanding mobility services - ** * 
BMW Switzerland Sauber / 60% / component development for F1 
cars + technology accelerator for entire company ** *** ** 
Daimler Iceland Icelandic New Energy / 16.82% / shift from 
fossil fuels to alternative energy in transport * *** - 
Daimler Czech 
Republic 
STARCAM / 51% / aluminium components for 
vehicles, including engine blocks - *** ** 
Daimler China MB SIM technology / 75% / R&D capabilities 
in vehicle design, powertrain and electronics ** ** ** 
VW Austria TTTech / 24.99% / driver safety, piloted driving, 
vehicle-integrated computer systems reliability *** *** - 
VW USA Cummins-Scania high pressure injection / 30% / 
high pressure injection systems for Scania  *** * * 
VW Sweden Mälardalens Teknikgymnasium / 80% / supply 
of trained staff for Scania - ** *** 
Note: Indicators show our interpretation of the extent to which each of the host country R&D determinants influenced the investment location and stake: *** = 
highly relevant; **= moderately relevant; * = somewhat relevant; - = not relevant 
